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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION-
PARKING LOTS ADJACENT TO A CHURCH EDIFICE AND USED
FOR CONVENIENCE OF CHURCH MEMBERS ARE TAXABLE.
Second Church of Christ Scientist v. Philadelphia (Pa. 1959)
The denial of the application of two churches for exemptions from
the city real estate and school district taxes on lots adjacent to the church
edifices and used exclusively as parking lots for people attending church
services was affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas, No. 6, of Phila-
delphia County. On appeal, however, the superior court, with two judges
dissenting, reversed both decisions in a consolidated opinion on the basis
that the parking lots were necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment
of the churches. It was found that there were insufficient parking places
in the church area, thus forcing many of the church members who lived
more than two miles away to park five or six blocks from the church
while attending services. The superior court decision was then reversed
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which held that the lots were
taxable. Second Church of Christ Scientist v. Philadelphia, 157 A.2d 54
(Pa. 1959).
Article nine, section one, of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides
that: "the General Assembly may, by general laws, exempt from taxa-
tion ... actual places of religious worship . . . ." This provision, however,
merely gives the General Assembly authority to grant tax exemptions and
does not of its own force provide for any such exemptions.' Acting pur-
suant to this authority, on May 22, 1933, the General Assembly enacted
P.L. 853 which exempts from city, school, and other taxes "all churches,
meeting-houses, or other regular places of stated worship, with the ground
thereto annexed necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same."'2
The word "necessary" in this statute has rot been interpreted to mean
an absolute necessity but only a reasonable necessity,3 and land used for
ingress and egress and to provide light and air for a church has been
exempted thereunder. 4 Also exempted as necessary for the occupancy and
enjoyment of a regular place of stated worship were the third floor of a
1. Philadelphia v. Barber, 160 Pa. 123, 28 At. 644 (1894). But see Mattern
v. Canevin, 213 Pa. 588, 63 AtI. 131 (1906).
2. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(a) (1950).
3. First Baptist Church v. Pittsburgh, 341 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d 209 (1941).
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synagogue which was only used for the storage of congregation effects, 5
and the dining halls, dormitories, and all the surrounding land of an asso-
ciation organized for the purpose of holding annual evangelistic meetings.8
In First Baptist Church v. Pittsburgh,7 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
expressly stated that church parking lots can be tax exempt, although such
an exemption was refused for a lot, only a part of which was used for
parking purposes, because the action was in equity to restrain total taxa-
tion for want of power to tax and could only be supported if the entire
lot were exempt. On the other hand, tax exemptions were denied to a
church parsonage8 and to a janitor's residence9 on the basis that they were
not necessary to a regular place of stated worship. A vacant lot held for
the future erection of a church, 10 land on which religious services were
occasionally held in a tent," and a piece of groufd on which an unfinished
cathedral was in process of construction1 2 were also held to be taxable
because they were not regular places of stated worship nor were they
necessary adjuncts thereto.
The court chose, in the instant case, to follow the precedents denying
exemption; however, the basis on which the denial is made is not clearly
stated in the opinion. One possible interpretation of the opinion is that
the statute which exempts land necessary to a regular place of stated wor-
ship must be read in the light of the constitutional language which limits
exemptions to "actual places of religious worship." Therefore, since the
statute cannot expand the permissive constitutional exemption'8 the word
"necessary" in the statute must be defined as meaning an absolute neces-
sity and limited to land which would qualify as an actual place of worship.
Although this interpretation would disallow all future religious exemp-
tions except for the actual structure and land absolutely necessary for its
use, it is substantiated by the language of the opinion which states: "The
status of an actual place of worship has not been extended beyond ingress
and egress, and light and air. We see no reason or permission, because
of the constitutional provision, to extend it farther. 11 4 However, the court
also stated that "we spoke of 'necessary' as being reasonable and not
absolute, but also excluded from it that which is merely desirable. We
5. Chevra Achewa Chesed Anshe Cheval v. Philadelphia, 116 Pa. Super. 101,
176 Atl. 779 (1935).
6. Penial Holiness Ass'n Appeal, 2 Erie 59, 48 Pa. County Ct. 389 (1911).
7. 341 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d 209 (1941). See also Pittsburgh v. Third Presbyterian
Church, 10 Pa. Super. 302 (1899). In the instant case, however, the court expressly
stated that it was not moved by such dictum. Second Church of Christ Scientist v.
Philadelphia, 157 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa. 1959).
8. Philadelphia v. St. Elizabeth's Church, 45 Pa. Super. 363 (1911).
9. Pittsburgh v. Third Presbyterian Church, 10 Pa. Super. 302 (1899).
10. Pittsburgh v. Third Presbyterian Church, 20 Pa. Super. 362 (1902).
11. Philadelphia v. Overbrook Park Corgregation, 171 Pa. Super. 581, 91 A.2d
310 (1952).
12. Mullen v. Commissioners of Erie County, 85 Pa. 288 (1877).
13. Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 At. 229 (1919).
14. Second Church of Christ Scientist v. Philadelphia, 157 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa. 1959).
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also limited necessity to entrance, exit, light, and air .... ,1" This language
makes a different interpretation of the case possible by implying that land
reasonably necessary to an actual place of religious worship would be tax
exempt, but that a parking lot is not reasonably necessary thereto. The
problem raised by this statement, however, is whether the court has limited
reasonable necessity to light, air, entrance, and exit and thereby restricted
exemptions in the same manner as the first discussed interpretation, or
whether reasonable necessity has only been limited by excluding from it
that which is merely desirable. The latter interpretation is less restrictive
and would allow exemptions for land which is found to be more nearly
necessary to an actual place of religious worship than a parking lot. Since
both quotations can be interpreted as restricting the permissible exemption
to land used for light and air, and entrance and exit it seems reasonable
to infer that this is what the court intended, although the ambiguity of
the language used allows the other interpretation to remain a distinct
possibility. Prior to the instant decision the problem facing the courts in
considering applications for religious exemptions for land other than that
used for the actual place of worship was whether the land was a reasonably
necessary adjunct to the actual place of worship. In the future, however,
before the courts can answer that question they must first decide whether
they can allow an exemption for land reasonably necessary to an actual
place of worship or whether the land must be absolutely necessary to the
place of worship in order to be exempt from taxation.
George R. Kucik
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION-
BIBLE READING AND RECITATION OF PRAYERS IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township (E.D. Pa. 1959)
This action' was brought by the plaintiffs as parents and as guardians
of their children who were pupils in the schools of Abington Township
to enjoin the reading of ten verses of the Holy Bible without comment2
15. Id. at 55.
1. Action was brought under 62 STAT. 932, 968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2281 (1948),
and was heard pursuant to 62 STAT. 968, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1948).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1930) provides as follows: "At least ten
verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, or caused to be read, without comment,
at the opening of each public school on each school day, by the teacher in charge:
Provided, That where any teacher has other teachers under and subject to direction,
then the teacher exercising such authority shall read the Holy Bible, or cause
it to be read, as herein directed.
"If any school teacher, whose duty it shall be to read the Holy Bible, or cause
it to be read, shall fail or omit so to do, said teacher shall, upon charges preferred
for such failure or omission, and proof of the same, before the board of school
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and the mass recitation of the Lord's Prayer s at the opening of each school
day. The plaintiffs 4 contended that these practices violated the first and
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. The district court
accepted this contention and held that these practices were unconstitutional
as they constituted an establishment of religion 5 and deprived the plaintiffs
of their free exercise of religion.6 Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington
Township, 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
The constitutionality of Bible reading and prayer recitation in public
schools has never before been adjudicated by the federal courts, but state
tribunals have often made determinations on this issue. The almost exclu-
sive basis of these decisions has been an interpretation of the state con-
stitutional provision dealing with religion, and such treatment has resulted
in a split of authority premised on divergent rationale. Several of these
cases have been decided on the ground that the state constitution prohibited
sectarian influences but that the Bible and prayer used were non-sectarian.7
Other decisions have been based on a finding that the Bible was merely
used as a textbook,8 or for the inculcation of general moral principles. 9
These practices have been upheld where the court has found that attendance
was optional, and the fact has been emphasized that only a compulsory
attendance program would be invalid.10 A minority of state tribunals have
reached the opposite result by holding that Bible reading and prayer
recitation in public schools constitutes an infringement of religious freedom
and an unwarranted excursion by a state instrumentality into the field of
sectarian instruction." The possibility of contending that these practices
were violative of the federal constitution arose when the United States
Supreme Court held that the religion provisions of the first amendment
were applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 12 How-
3. A directive for the recitation of the Lord's Prayer is included in the "Em-
ployees' Handbook and Administrative Guide," issued from the office of the Superin-
tendent of Abington Township Schools. The origin of the practice of reciting the
Lord's Prayer coupled with Bible reading is obscure, although the practice has
endured for over thirty years.
4. Both the parents and their three children are members of the Unitarian
Church.
5. The Superintendent of the Schools testified that only the King James Version
of the Bible was issued and read. The plaintiffs testified that they did not believe
in the divinity of Christ, the Immaculate Conception, or the concepts of an anthropo-
morphic God of the Trinity, but all of these doctrines were read to the children
during their course of instruction in the Abington Township Schools.
6. One of the children, who at the time of the action had been graduated from
Abington Senior High School, asked to be excused from the "morning devotions,"
but he was told by the Assistant Principal that he should attend the exercises as did
the other students. This was the only protest made by the plaintiffs as to participation
in the ceremony, and it appeared that one of the children on occasion volunteered to
read the Bible.
7. People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 275, 255 Pac. 610 (1927) ; Church
v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908).
8. Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ., 118 Mich. 560, 77 N.W. 250 (1898).
9. Hacket v. School Dist. 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905).
10. Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927).
11. People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910);
State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W. 846 (1902).
12. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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ever, the first state tribunal faced with this argument subjected the first
amendment to the distinction between sectarian and non-sectarian in-
fluences, and thus held that the Old Testament was a non-sectarian docu-
ment and that reading it in public schools did not violate any of the
religious prohibitions of the federal constitution.'8 The Supreme Court
of the United States has on four occasions been presented with the problem
of religion in the field of public education, with the claim being made that
there was either an establishment of religion or a deprivation of the free
exercise of religion by the state. The former was unsuccessfully argued in
a contention that a state could not use public funds for the transportation
of pupils attending parochial schools. 4 The released time program15 in
the public schools was the next arena for the establishment clause battle,
and the Court declared that such a program was in violation of this clause
when it took place in the school, and school authorities approved and
supervised religious instructors, kept attendance records, and supplied
secular instruction for pupils not attending the religious classes. 16 How-
ever, a program which was administered away from school property with
the only state support being an adjustment of schedules by the public
school officials was held constitutional.' In West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette,8 a statute requiring the salute and pledge to the flag
in the schools was held to be a denial of religious freedom because it
compelled the participation in the exercise by pupils whose religious
dictates forbade a manifestation of this nature.
Bible reading and prayer recitation in public schools are open to con-
stitutional attack based on the establishment and free exercise clauses of
the first amendment to the federal constitution. The former is premised
upon the declaration of the Supreme Court of the United States in Everson
v. Board of Educ.,19 and adopted in McCollum v. Board of Educ.20 From
these decisions it becomes apparent that a state is in conflict with the
establishment clause when it enacts laws which aid one religion over
another or religion in general. Thus, when a state requires that a religious
instrument such as the Bible be read in public schools in an atmosphere
which creates the impression of a religious ceremony, it engages in the
inculcation of religious doctrines and aids the group which adheres to the
religious teachings of the instrument at the expense of those with contrary
religious beliefs or none at all. Such conduct by the state must be cate-
13. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950). The United
States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 342 U.S. 429(1952).
14. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. The procedure of these programs is to release the student from secular
instruction and allow him to participate in religious instruction offered by any of
the faiths.
16. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
17. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
18. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
19. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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gorized as aid to a degree that is forbidden by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the establishment clause. These practices do not appear
to be of such insignificance that one might properly contend that they are
nothing more than an accommodation to religion by the State, and thus
permissible.21 Bible reading and prayer recitation also interfere with the
individual's right freely to exercise his religious preference, and this is
present whether the pupil's attendance is required or optional. Required
attendance would be violative of the Supreme Court's holding in the
Barnette case ;22 but even where attendance is not required, there is still
present a subtle form of compulsion sufficient to justify a court in finding
that such a program denies freedom of religion.2 3 This indirect or subtle
compulsion centers on the desire of the child to avoid embarrassment and
thus compels conformity with conduct of his contemporaries. In reality
such a program presents no option at all. Therefore, even though the
public welfare may demand that there be religious instruction in the public
schools so that moral training can be achieved, it should be limited to the
home and church as it appears that the Constitution forbids such an
alliance of state and religion.
Harry J. Oxman
EVIDENCE-BLooD TESTS-CONCLUSIVENESS OF TESTS ON THE
ISSUE OF NoN-PATERNITY.
Commonwealth v. D'Avella (Mass. 1959)
In a paternity prosecution under a Massachusetts statute' defendant
admitted having sexual relations with the complainant but not within the
period of gestation. Pursuant to a statutory provision,2 a blood grouping
test3 was made, the result of which excluded defendant as the father of the
child. The result of the test was introduced into evidence, the Common-
wealth conceding that the test was properly administered. Defendant then
21. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
22. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).23. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion).
1. MAss. GEN. LAws c. 273, § 11 (1954).
2. MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 273, § 12A (1954). This section provides, in part:
"In any proceeding to determine the question of paternity, the court, on motion of
the defendant, shall order the mother, her child and the defendant to submit to one or
more blood tests, to be made by a duly qualified physician or other duly qualified
person, designated by the court ..... The results of such tests shall be admissible
in evidence only in cases where definite exclusion of the defendant as such father has
been established."
3. For good discussions of the underlying scientific principle involved in blood
grouping tests see: 1 WIGMoa, EVIDtNCt, §§ 165a, 165b (3d ed. 1940); Hooker
and Boyd, Blood Grouping as a Test of Non-Paternity, 25 J. GRIM. L. 186 (1934). A
very good study of the problem for the trial practitioner is Boyd, Protecting the
Evidentiary Value of Blood Grouping Determinations, 16 So. CAL. L. Rev. 193 (1943).
SPRING 1960]
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moved for a verdict of not guilty as a matter of law, but the judge denied
defendant's motion and, sitting without a jury, found him guilty solely on
the testimony of the complainant. On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court
sustained defendant's exceptions and reversed, holding that where a blood
test, the accuracy of which is not in dispute, excludes defendant as the
father, defendant is entitled to a finding in his favor as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 162 N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 1959).
Although widely accepted and used in foreign courts at a relatively
early date,4 blood grouping tests have been received by courts in this
country with mixed emotions.5 However, the reliability and accuracy of
these tests, which were previously questioned in our courts,6 are well
known and accepted at the present time and most courts do not hesitate
to take judicial notice of their reliability.7 Therefore, it is generally accepted
that blood grouping tests are admissible as evidence in any action where
paternity or identity is at issue.8 Thus, blood grouping tests, if relevant,
are admissible in criminal prosecutions,9 filiation or paternity suits,10
bastardy proceedings," divorce or annulment actions,' 2 or actions for
support of a child.' 8 In cases where paternity is in issue, it is generally
held that test results are admissible as evidence only when the results
definitely exclude the defendant as the father. 14 However, the main area
of controversy is the weight that the test results should be accorded on
the issue of paternity.' 5 The instant case, in making uncontested test
results conclusive, follows the modern view that negative blood tests are
4. Galton, Blood Grouping Tests and Their Relationship to the Law, 17 ORR. L.
Rv. 177, 185 (1937) ; Schloch, Determination of Paternity by Blood Grouping Tests:
The European Experience, 16 So. CAL. L. Rgv. 177 (1943).
5. Britt, Blood Grouping Tests and the Law: The Problem of the "Cultural Lag"
21 MINN L. Rsv. 671 (1937); Galton, supra note 4.
6. State ex rel. Slovak v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N.E.2d 962 (1939);
Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 Atl. 298 (1936).
7. Shanks v. State, 437 Md. 185, 45 A.2d 85 (1945). The view of most courts
was expressed in Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 157, 76 A.2d 717, 720(1950): "It is plain we should hold, as we do, that this unanimity of respected
authorities justifies our taking judicial notice of the general recognition of the
accuracy and value of such tests when properly performed by persons skilled in
giving them." Compare Commonwealth v. English, supra note 6, where the court
said at page 301: "The record is entirely devoid of scientific accuracy of such
tests. We have only the assertion of counsel in the argument and references to
certain scientific discussions. The blood grouping tests have not attained such
standing as to justify a court in taking judicial notice of their value."
8. Blood Test Results as Conclusive Proof of Non-Paternity, 44 J. CRIm. L. 472,
473-74 (1954).
9. State v. Beard, 16 N.J. 50, 106 A.2d 265 (1954).
10. Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667, 71 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Dona. Rel. Ct. 1947).
11. Ross v. Marx, 24 N.J. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952).
12. State v. Shanks, 437 Md. 185, 45 A.2d 85 (1945) ; Dellaria v. D'ellaria, 183
Misc. 832, 52 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
13. Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954).
14. People v. Nichols, 341 Mich. 311, 67 N.W.2d 230 (1954); Ross v. Marx,
24 N.J. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952). Contra, Livermore v. Livermore, 233 Iowa
1155, 11 N.W.2d 389 (1943).
15. Compare Jordon v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949), with State ex rel.
Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E.2d 773 (1944). See also Weiner, The
Judicial Weight of Blood Grouping Test Results, 31 J. CRIM. L. 523 (1941); Blood
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conclusive on the issue of non-paternity unless sufficient evidence is in-
troduced to support a jury finding that these tests were inaccurately
administered. 16
When dealing with blood grouping tests as evidence in paternity
cases, courts are faced with two separate problems which should be
distinguished in order to avoid needless confusion. The first problem is
whether the court should take judicial notice of the reliability of the
underlying biological principle involved in blood grouping tests or whether
this issue should be submitted to the jury for determination.17  Today
most courts would take judicial notice of the accuracy of such tests,' 8 and
once they do so, plaintiff can no longer attack its validity and the jury
must accept it as a final determination of that issue.'9 The second problem,
and the one involved in the instant case, is what weight should be accorded
to the test results as evidence in determining paternity. One approach
to this problem is to treat test results merely as testimony of an expert
witness 20 which does not deserve greater weight than non-expert testi-
mony.21 However, this approach would seem to be clearly wrong since
the test result is not merely expert opinion but is an objectively verifiable
fact and should be treated as such. Other courts applying a second
approach hold that the test results are not conclusive, but grant a new
trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
when the jury finds defendant guilty after defendant introduced a validly
administered blood test and no scientific evidence contrary to the test
result was introduced.2 2 This view, in effect, makes the test result con-
clusive in fact but not in law, and much needless litigation would be avoided
if the courts would direct a verdict for defendant as a matter of law. A
third approach makes negative blood test results conclusive on the issue of
paternity unless the plaintiff, or prosecution in a criminal action, introduces
scientific evidence contrary to the test result or produces sufficient evi-
16. Jordon v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE,
§ 178 (1954); Comment, 3 VILL. L. REv. 180, 181 (1958). This view was also
adopted by the UNIFORM ACT ON BLooD TESTs To DETERMINE PATERNITY, §§ 1-3.
17. See supra note 8.
18. Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J.
Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950); In re Swahn, 158 Misc. 17, 285 N.Y. Supp. 234
(Surr. Ct. 1936); State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936). Contra,
State ex rel. Slovak v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N.E.2d 962 (1939); Common-
wealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 At. 298 (1936).
19. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300-03 (1937);
McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 330 (1954) ; Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. RPv. 269,
273-87 (1944).
20. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 638, 169 P.2d 442 (1946). In that case the
court said at page 451 ".... evidence concerning the blood test is 'expert opinion'...."
21. Berry v. Chaplin, supra note 20; Arais v. Kalensnickoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P.2d
1043 (1938); Ross v. Marx, 24 N.J. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952).
22. Commonwealth v. Gromo, 190 Pa. Super. 519, 154 A.2d 417 (1959); Com-
monwealth v. Coyle, 190 Pa. Super. 509, 154 A.2d 412 (1959) ; Comment, 3 VILL. L.
REv. 180, 196 (1958). Pennsylvania courts apply a doctrine called the "incontro-
vertible physical fact" doctrine which could be used to lift Pennsylvania out of this
illogical situation if that doctrine could be extended to cover blood grouping test
results, which are definitely "incontrovertible physical facts." See Lamp v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 305 Pa. 520, 158 At. 269 (1931).
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dence from which the jury could find that the tests were improperly
administered. 23 This approach has the advantage of preventing unscientific
and often self-serving evidence being used to contradict the results of a
proven scientific test. When a scientific principle has achieved such a
degree of certitude that no reasonable man could doubt its accuracy, courts
should not allow juries to fly in the face of common sense by returning a
verdict contrary to this proven scientific principle. Once the validity
of the test is accepted, the defendant should be granted a verdict in his
favor as a matter of law2 4 since no other result is reasonable under the
circumstances.
Joseph G. Manta
LABOR LAW-UNION SECURITY AGREEMENT-USE OF QUALIFYING
PHRASE To SAVE INVALID UNION MEMBERSHIP PROVISION.
Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp. (7th Cir. 1959)
The plaintiffs, trustees of a union welfare and retirement fund, sought
recovery against the defendant employer for contributions due to the fund
under a collective bargaining agreement with defendant. This agreement
also contained a union security clause which stated that, as a condition of
employment, all employees shall be, or become, members of the union "to
the extent and in the manner permitted by law," while another provision
made all parts of the instrument dependent on each other. Plaintiffs
admitted that no new employees were permitted to work for the defendant
corporation more than three days without joining the union,' and there-
fore, defendant argued that the agreement was invalid by providing for a
closed shop in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Labor Management
Relations Act.2 The district court rendered summary judgment for the
23. Jordon v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949) ; Commissioner of Welfare
v. Costonie, 277 App. Div. 90, 97 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1950) ; UNIFORM AcT ON
BLOOD TESTs To DETERMINE PATERNITY, §§ 1-3.
24. Although it is traditionally the function of the jury to weigh the credi-
bility of the witness, when, as in the instant case, the test giver has been designated
by the court and where no scientific evidence has been introduced to the contrary,
the jury should not be allowed to disbelieve him unless his credibility is attacked.
See Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 196 Pa. 610, 613, 46 Ati. 937, 938 (1900),
where the court declared that when the testimony is not improbable nor at variance
with proved or admitted facts and comes from a witness whose candor there
is no apparent grounds for doubting, the jury is not at liberty to indulge in
capricious disbelief. But see Comment, 3 VILL. L. Rev. 180, 190 (1958).
1. Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140, 144 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1959) (dis-
senting opinion).
2. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (3), 61
STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952): "(a) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for .an employer ... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
9
Editors: Recent Decisions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960
RECENT DECISIONS
plaintiffs and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with one judge dis-
senting, affirmed, holding that the collective bargaining agreement was not
invalid, since the inclusion of the qualifying phrase "to the extent and in
the manner permitted by law" brought the union security clause within
the exception created by the Labor Management Relations Act for agree-
ments requiring, as a condition of employment, union membership on or
after the thirtieth day following the beginning of employment.8 Lewis v.
Quality Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1959).
The mere execution of a contract containing a forbidden union security
clause constitutes an unfair labor practice because such a clause tends to
encourage membership in a labor organization by forcing the individual
employee to risk discriminatory action if he refuses to become a member
of the union.4 Whereas the whole contract is invalidated by such a clause
in an integrated contract, 5 only the forbidden union security clause need be
invalidated when the contract is severable and the parties have acted in
good faith.8 Another means of saving the contract when a provision is
invalidated as violative of the National Labor Relations Act is the saving
clause, which purports to disclaim any provision which is inconsistent
with federal or state law while stipulating that all valid provisions remain
effective.7 These clauses, though not illegal per se,8 have seldom been
effective, chiefly because of their vagueness.9 Thus, an agreement which
contains an unlawful union security clause is not saved by a provision
that all clauses of the contract which "are affected" by the National Labor
Relations Act,10 or "held to be invalid" under the National Labor Relations
Act, 1 shall be void or inoperative. The court's reason that such language,
since it does not specify which, if any, clauses are to be inoperative, would
not help the ordinary employee to understand that the union security
clause is no longer binding, so that he will feel compelled to abide by any
membership in any labor organization: Provided, that nothing in this sub-chapter,
... shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization
. . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the
thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of
such agreement, whichever is the later ..
3. Ibid.
4. NLRB v. Broderick, 261 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1958); Red Star Express
Lines of Auburn v. NLRB. 196 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1952).
5. NLRB v. Broderick, supra note 4; Lewis v. Jackson & Squire, 86 F. Supp.
354 (D.D.C. 1949).
6. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1952).
7. NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 347 U.S. 17 (1953), affirming 197 F.2d 719
(2d Cir. 1953). This case deals with a typical saving clause, which reads: "Should
any provision of this contract at any time during its life be in conflict with federal
or state law, then such provision shall continue in effect only to the extent permitted.
In this event, the remaining provisions of the agreement shall, nevertheless, remain
in full force and effect."
8. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 78 (1952).
9. NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 347 U.S. 17, affirming 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Broderick, 261 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1958) ; NLRB v. Shuck Const. Co., 243
F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Gottfried, 210 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1954); Red
Star Express Lines of Auburn v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1952).
10. Red Star Express Lines of Auburn v. NLRB, supra note 9.
11. NLRB v. Shuck Const. Co., 243 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1957).
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union security clause of questionable validity rather than risk the possible
consequences.1 2 Only a specific provision preventing application of the
illegal union security clause will immunize the contract from illegality.1
3
In the principal case the court found this specific provision in the phrase
"to the extent and in the manner permitted by law" where such language
served to restrict and modify the words of the same sentence in which it
was employed, and related to that subject matter alone. 14 Here the
validity of the union membership provision was not dependent upon some
vague or indefinite saving clause, but was assured and protected by the
very language in which the condition of union membership was stated. 15
Since the provision was qualified by its own terms rather than by some
independent general saving clause, it met the test of legality.' 6
Where an agreement contains a union security provision of doubtful
validity which the agreement attempts to save by subsequent modification
or qualification, courts have placed a great deal of emphasis on the notice
that the subsequent language gives to employees as to their rights and
obligations with respect to attainment or maintenance of union status.
17
The agreement in the principal case, together with the alleged practice of
firing a non-conforming new employee after three days, would be almost
certain to render a new or prospective employee ignorant as to these rights
and obligations. Furthermore, if the court had resorted to the general
judicial policy of interpreting ambiguous language in a contract by looking
to the performance of the parties under the contract,1 8 it would have found
in fact an invalid closed shop agreement.' 9 But the court refused to do
this, reasoning that although the practice of firing a non-conforming em-
ployee after three days constitutes in itself an unfair labor practice, it
does not alter the terms or affect the validity of the agreement.2 0 In a
similar situation, the Supreme Court enforced a contract with an illegal
provision by severing the illegal provision from the contract, 21 but in the
instant case, the court was faced with an integrated instrument2 2 whose
provisions could not be severed. Finally, the court might have followed
the National Labor Relations Board policy of being less strict in interpret-
12. NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 347 U.S. 17, affirming 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir.
1953).
13. Ibid.
14. Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140, at 143 (7th Cir. 1959).
15. Id. at 143.
16. Ibid.
17. NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 347 U.S. 17, affirming 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir.
1953); NLRB v. Broderick, 261 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1958) ; NLRB v. Shuck Const.
Co., 243 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1957) ; NLRB v. Gottfried, 210 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1954)
Red Star Express Lines of Auburn v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1952).
18. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. and Lodge No. 1366, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 98 N.L.R.B. 753 (1952).
19. Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140, at 144 (7th Cir. 1959) (dissenting
opinion).
20. Id. at 143.
21. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1952).
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ing a contract where the provisions sought to be enforced are concededly
valid, and only collateral provisions are questionable in the light of the
National Labor Relations Act, but to insist on the strictest requirements
of legality when the questionable provisions are being attacked in an
unfair labor practice action. 23 This would serve to justify the court's
decision, which was apparently equitable as between the union and the
employer, without necessarily condoning a clause which might be stricken
in an unfair labor practice action. However, it is submitted that the court
would have best served the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act
by declaring the integrated contract invalid, thereby imposing a fitting
sanction on the union, since unions as well as employers are forbidden to
enter into illegal union security contracts, 24 and thereby also providing
a forceful deterrent against the subtle form of pressure which these ques-
tionable contracts tend to exert on employees.
L. Francis Murphy
LIMITATION OF ACTION S-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-STATUTE
COMMENCES To RUN WHEN INJURY DISCOVERED.
Ayers v. Morgan (Pa. 1959)
On April 20, 1948, plaintiff underwent an operation at the hands of
the defendant surgeon for the removal of an intestinal ulcer. Subsequent
to his discharge from the hospital on May 4, 1948, plaintiff experienced
pains in the area of his abdomen. On January 3, 1957, almost nine years
after the operation, plaintiff re-entered the hospital and tests were adminis-
tered which uncovered the presence in plaintiff's abdominal cavity of a
surgical sponge, which the defendant had neglected to remove on com-
pletion of the operation. Plaintiff brought suit in the Court of Common
Pleas of Luzerne County for negligence, and the defendant raised in defense
the statute of limitations.' That court found for the defendant, and on
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed holding that the
statute of limitations began to run against the patient's cause of action for
malpractice not when the surgeon left the sponge in plaintiff's abdomen,
but rather when he discovered its presence almost nine years later. Ayers
v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
By statute, in every jurisdiction, actions for personal injury must be
commenced by the plaintiff within a certain period after the injury has
23. Regal Shoe Co. and Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, AFL, 106 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1953).
24. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (2), 61 STAT.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(2) (1952).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1954).
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occurred 2 or after the cause of action has accrued. 3 However, in cases
where a foreign object has been negligently left in a patient's body as the
result of an operation, thus making it difficult or impossible for the plaintiff
to determine that a cause of action has accrued to him, there is a sharp
split of authority whether the statute should begin to run on the completion
of the negligent act of the physician, or alternatively, upon the discovery
of the injury by the patient. 4 In the majority of states, the courts have
held that the mere fact that the patient was unaware of his injury does
not postpone the running of the statutory period.5 There are decisions to
the contrary, stating that the statute does not begin to run until the patient
learns, or should have learned, of the presence of the foreign object,6 and
these holdings seem to be based on an idea of continuing negligence of
the physician during the time the foreign object remains in the body.7
Cases like Gillette v. Tucker,8 which involve the continuation of treatment
by the doctor after the operation, have led to another line of decisions
holding that the statute commences to run from the time of the termina-
tion of such services.9 Up to the present time, the position of the Pennsyl-
vania courts on this matter has not been clear. In Byers v. Bacon,10 the
court seemed to apply the continuing negligence theory and held that the
patient should have been allowed to introduce evidence as to circumstances
which might have effected a tolling of the statute." But then in Bernath v.
2. Ibid.
3. OHio GEN. Coo § 11225 (Baldwin1948).
4. Anderson, The Application of Statutes of Limitation To Actions Against
Physicians and Surgeons, 25 INs. CoUNSEL, J. 237 (1958). In the article, 'the author
speaks of ". . . the myriad of. confusing decisions cited in support of the various
theories advanced for tolling or preventing the running of the statute of limitations
against malpractice actions against physicians and surgeons."
5. Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940); Cappuci v. Barone, 266
Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919); Conklin v. Draper, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (App.
Div. 1930) ; Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
6. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Huysman v. Kirsch,
6 Cal. App. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
7. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
8. 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). It should be noted that nearly all
of the foreign object causes do involve continuing treatment by the physician after
the operation. Some courts, instead of finding that the cause of action arises at the
discovery as in the usual continuing negligence cases, decide that the statute begins to
run when the malpractice ceases, at the termination of treatment. Such decisions
may be due to the courts' viewing malpractice as a breach of contract. See Bowers
v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919).
9. Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 129, 65 N.E. 865, 871 (1902). "... the
mere closing of the incision in question over the sponge was not the plaintiff's
cause of action, if no injurious consequences followed. But if evil consequences fol-
lowed, and plaintiff was injured, her cause of action accrues when her injury
occurred; and if these injuries blended and extended during the entire period the
surgeon was in charge of the case, her right of action became complete when the
surgeon gave up the case without performance of his duty." Accord, Sly v. Van
Lengen, 198 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Misc. 1923).
10. 250 Pa. 564, 95 At. 711 (1915).
11. Id. at 567, 95 At. at 711. "All that we now decide is that the court below
should have admitted the evidence offered by the plaintiff . . . before determining
whether the action was barred by the statute of limitations." The court seems to
indicate at least that the statute could be tolled.
13
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Le Fevre,x2 a case which did not involve a foreign object but rather the
negligent performance of an eye operation, 3 the court expressly said that
the period begins to run from the time of the negligent act "even though
the damage may not have been known ... until afterwards.' 4 The instant
decision follows the theory of the Byers 5 case that the facts give rise to a
kind of continuing negligence, and thus the period of limitation begins
on discovery of the foreign object.
Justice Musmanno, in presenting the opinion of the court in the instant
case, contends that to allow the defendant to raise the statute of limitations
on these facts would lead to an "illogical and unintelligent" result,1
and suggests that the decision here is justified by the application of the
"intention of the legislature" statute. 17 However, the authorities cited by
the court as supporting a theory of continuing negligence resulting in an
"injury" when discovered are not convincing. The court's reference to the
Byers case is to dictum. Furthermore, the other malpractice cases to
which the court refers" are distinguishable because in each of those actions
the patient continued to be treated by the physician after the operation.
It is not too difficult to apply the theory of continuing negligence when the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant has been maintained, but this
decision extends the continuing negligence idea to cover cases where there
is no continued treatment. This might seem to be an unwarranted exten-
sion, especially in light of the fact that the very concept of continuing
negligence in malpractice cases is considered tenuous by some.19 More-
over, the court argues that, since a cause of action cannot accrue until the
plaintiff incurs an injury,20 the patient here had no action until discovery.
This is not persuasive, as it would seem that the plaintiff was injured on
the very day of the operation,21 and surely he incurred some injury from
the presence of the sponge during the succeeding seven years which would
12. 325 Pa. 43, 189 Atl. 342 (1937).
13. The action in the case was to recover for injuries to, and the ultimate
loss of, an eye due to a negligently performed operation.
14. Bernard v. Le Fevre, 325 Pa.. 43, 46, 189 At. 342, 343 (1937).
15. Byers v. Bacon, 250 Pa. 564, 95 At. 711 (1915).
16. Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 283, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (1959).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 552 (1954). "In ascertaining the intention of the
Legislature in the enactment of a law, the courts may be guided by the following
presumptions among others: (1) That the Legislature does not intend a result
that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable." Justice McBride in his
concurring opinion seems to favor this ground for reaching the same result.
18. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Akridge v. Noble,
114 Ga. 949, 41 S.E. 78 (1902); Barnett v. Brand, 165 Ky. 616, 177 S.W. (1915);
Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 965 (1902).
19. Gillette v. Tucker, supra note 18, at 135, 65 N.E. at 872. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Davis declares: "In order to sustain this strained conclusion, the
court calls attention to the failure of the defendant to discover and remove the
foreign substance which be had left in the wound at the time of the operation, and
designates it as a continuing act of negligence on his part . . . . But the ground
of this action was not, and could not be, negligence in the after treatment . . . But
the line of authority is unbroken that, if the original act of negligence causes damage,
although only nominal in extent, a cause of action accrues eo instante ...."
20. Foley v. Pittsburgh Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
21. Bernath v. Le Fevre, 325 Pa. 43, 189 Atl. 342 (1937).
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have given rise to a cause of action subsequently barred by the statute.
However, it is not the purpose of the statute of limitations to deprive
persons of their just rights, and based on ideas of policy and logical
reasoning, relief should be given from the strict application of the statute
in peculiar fact Situations like the instant one. But it would seem that the
adage "hard cases make bad law" holds true. Proper legislative addition
to the statute, allowing it to commence running in foreign object cases
where the plaintiff discovers, or should discover the injury, would reap
more desirable results.
Thomas J. Ward
SALES-BREACH OF WARRANTY-DIRECT ACTION AGAINST
MANUFACTURER BY REMOTE BUYER.
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co. (Pa. Super. 1959)
Plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit x against both the distributor
and manufacturer of a tractor to recover for damage to the tractor and its
trailer caused by a defective kingpin.2 The jury returned a verdict in favor
of the distributor and against the manufacturer, Ford Motor Co., but the
trial court modified the verdict, making the distributor primarily liable
and limiting the liability of Ford Motor Co. to that of an indemnitor. On
appeal, the superior court struck the verdict against the distributor, but
affirmed as to the Ford Motor Co. and held the manufacturer was liable
for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Jarnot v. Ford
Motor Co., 156 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. 1959).
Although the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between plaintiff
and defendant has long been required in an action of assumpsit for breach
of warranty,3 there is a modern trend of authority toward abrogating the
requirement of such privity in actions in which the defendant is a manu-
facturer whose product was sold to the plaintiff-buyer through a middle-
man.4 Where the theory of the action is breach of an express warranty
created by representations to the plaintiff, the privity requirement is rela-
tively easy to ignore because the representations can be said to provide the
1. The action was brought under the Uniform Sales Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, § 124 (1931), because at the time the cause of action arose the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE had not yet been enacted in Pennsylvania.
2. The tractor purchase order contained a disclaimer of warranty by the Ford
Motor Co., but the court held that it only served to disclaim express warranties.
3. Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 Ati. 271 (1910) ; Turner
v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928) ; Chysky v. Drake
Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923) ; James A. Spruill, Jr., Privity Of Contract
As A Requisite For Recovery On Warranty, 19 N. C. L. Riv. 551 (1941).
4. Decker v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942) ; James A Spruill, Jr.,
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necessary connection between the buyer and the manufacturer. 5 This was
done in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.6 where the manufacturer represented
to the buyer by means of pamphlets that its cars were equipped with
shatter-proof glass, and the buyer was later injured by flying glass when
the windshield was shattered by a pebble. Representations by the manu-
facturer through the medium of national advertising 7 and on the package
in which the product is contained 8 have also been held to create express
warranties in actions by buyers for personal injuries caused by the failure
of the product to be as represented. Although the courts have been more
disposed to allow recovery against the manufacturer for breach of an
express warranty which caused personal injuries,9 they have also allowed
recovery for property damage'0 on the same theory, as in U.S. Pipe &
Foundry Co. v. Waco" where a written statement to the buyer by the
manufacturer as to the strength of its pipe was held to create an express
warranty which was breached when the pipe cracked. Recovery against the
manufacturer has not been entirely limited to actions for breach of express
warranties, but has been extended to actions for breach of implied war-
ranties in situations where the manufacturer produces food unfit for human
consumption and that food causes personal injuries to the plaintiff-buyer.12
This food exception to the privity rule has been extended to include un-
merchantable ice,' 3 and in Mazzetti v. Armour & Co.,14 recovery was
allowed where the harm to the buyer was only loss of reputation and not
5. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 228 N.W. 309 (1939),
allowed the buyer to sue the manufacturer for breach of an express warranty
where pamphlets issued by the manufacturer emphasized that its cars had seamless
roofs and the buyer was injured in an accident when his head hit a seam welding the
two halves of the roof together. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12
P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
6. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). On appeal from the retrial, the supreme
court affirmed the previous decision, but seemed to base the affirmance on a theory
of deceit, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
7. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent, 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
8. Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 523
(1952) (representations on a box of detergent); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217
N.C. 542, 8 S.E. 813 (1940) (representations on a can of insecticide).
9. In Mannsz v. Macewhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946), it was held that
representations in a manual ran to the public and it was irrelevant that the buyer
did not read them. Recovery was denied to the buyer in his action for personal
injuries, however, because he did not use the product in accordance with instructions.
10. Burr v. Sherwin-Williams, 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954), contained
dicta that the manufacturer would be liable for crop damage for breach of an ex-
press warranty, but held that privity is required for actions in implied warranty;
Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948), held that where a manu-
facturer writes on a package a provision for the dealer to refund the purchase price
if the soap contained therein does not meet with entire approval, this writing
is a representation to a remote vendee that the soap would be fit for use; Hoskins
v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) ; Jeffrey v. Hanson, 239 P.2d 346
(Wash. 1952).
11. 130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W. 2d 432, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937).
12. Klein v. Duches Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939) ; Vaccarezzo
v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945) ; Swengel v. F & E Whole-
sale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938) ; Decker v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
13. Gladioala Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959).
14. 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
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personal injury from the contaminated food. Recently, recovery against a
manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty has been allowed where
personal injuries were caused by an unmerchantable hair waiving lotion,'15
and where property damage was caused by unmerchantable building
blocks,' 6 thereby extending the privity exception for breach of implied
warranties to actions where the product involved is not food and there are
no personal injuries.
The direct holding in the instant case is that an action of assumpsit
for breach of an implied warranty will lie under the Uniform Sales Act17
for property damage caused by a non-food product. Although the afore-
mentioned building blocks case also reached the same result on the theory
of implied warranty, that holding is limited by the court's statement that a
negligent manufacturer will not escape liability due to lack of privity
merely because the buyer brought his action in implied warranty. I8 There
was no allusion to negligence in the instant case, but the court did mention,
in passing, the national advertising campaign of the defendant.19 This
statement may be interpreted as the basis of the decision and may thereby
limit the holding of the case to situations in which the manufacturer makes
some sort of representation to the buyer, although it seems clear that the
court did not consider such representation necessary when it stated without
qualification: "A person .. . may bring an action in assumpsit against
the manufacturer based on a breach of implied warranty ...and proof of
a contractual relationship or privity between the manufacturer and the pur-
chaser is not necessary .... -20 The fact that the court did not hold the
manufacturer liable only as an indemnitor but insisted that it be primarily
liable is further evidence that the court had no desire to limit the manu-
facturer's liability in any way, but intended that all manufacturers should
be absolutely and primarily liable for any breach of implied warranty. Thus,
in considering this decision along with the prior cases which abolished the
privity requirement in actions for breach of express warranties, for breach
of implied warranties in the sale of food, and for personal injuries caused
15. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d
181 (1958). The opinion referred to the representations on the package and the
national advertising campaign of the defendant. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176
Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954), reached the same result in a personal injury action
against a wholesaler.
16. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873' (1958).
17. The result would probably be the same under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1954), Supp., P.L. 426, Oct. 2, 1959, because
comment 3 thereto specifically states that the statute is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the growing body of case law on manufacturer's liability for breach of
warranty to remote buyers.
18. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873, 879 (1958).
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by the breach of implied warranties in the sale of non-food products, it
seems that the court has taken the final step necessary to the complete
abolition of the privity requirement in actions for breach of warranty. 2'
George R. Kucik
SURETYSHIP-RIGHT OF A SURETY AGAINST CO-SURETIES-
EXONERATION PRIOR TO PAYMENT.
Nissenberg v. Fellman (Mass. 1959)
A Massachusetts corporation of which plaintiffs and defendants are
stockholders, officers and directors entered into an agreement with the
Whitehall Mercantile Corporation to provide for securing certain loans.
Plaintiffs and defendants each executed a guaranty agreement whereby
the signers jointly and severally guaranteed "the due payment and per-
formance" by the corporation "of all moneys to be paid . . . pursuant
to... [the] agreement."' Plaintiffs, alleging that Whitehall had instituted
a suit against them and that their property had been attached, brought a
bill in equity seeking a decree that defendants "are jointly and severally
liable for one-half the obligation which plaintiffs . . .may be obligated
to pay," and an order that defendants pay to Whitehall one-half of any
judgment which Whitehall may recover against the plaintiffs. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressed the opinion that the plaintiffs
would have a right to exoneration in equity in such a situation and reversed
a final decree dismissing the bill. However, the court affirmed the granting
of an interlocutory decree sustaining defendant's demurrer and allowed
plaintiffs thirty days to amend because the bill failed to allege that plaintiffs
and defendants as well as the principal debtor were under a duty of
immediate performance to Whitehall, the creditor. Nissenberg v. Feleman,
162 N.E.2d 304 (Mass. 1959).
The earliest adjudications allowing contribution between co-sureties
were based upon the custom of the city of London whereby persons having
a common liability with others were put under obligations to reimburse
21. The privity requirement has been abolished for negligence actions since the
decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Since modern methods of advertising and communication have changed our marketing
system so that purchasers now rely on manufacturers of certain products more
so than on the retailers who dispense them, and since manufacturers are generally
in a better position to spread the loss from adverse judgments and in many cases
have the last chance to discover and cure the defects, it seems just that the manu-
facturers should bear the burden of liability when their products do not conform to
reasonable standards of merchantability.
1. Nissenberg v. Felleman, 162 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Mass. 1959).
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their co-obligors who paid more than their share.2 Although the law courts
at an early date refused to recognize the right,3 a bill for contribution
between co-sureties was shortly thereafter allowed in equity, based not
upon contract but on the equitable principle that where two or more persons
are primarily liable on the same obligation and one of them pays, the
others should contribute their shares. 4 In the early part of the nineteenth
century the law courts first allowed contribution between sureties in an
action for money paid to the use of another. 5 Despite this assumption of
jurisdiction over the action for contribution by the law courts, it has been
held that equity retains its jurisdiction.6 It has been often stated that a
right of contribution cannot arise until one surety has paid more than his
proportion of the obligation 7 and as a rule at law this would seem correct
as until such payment has been made no action for money paid to the use
of another could lie. However, the English court in the case of Wolmer-
hausen v. Gullick8 has held that where there were co-sureties upon a note
and the creditor had obtained judgment against plaintiff as executrix of
one of the sureties she could maintain her bill in equity for contribution
notwithstanding the fact that she had paid nothing. This case has been
approved by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Malone v.
Stewart9 and its rule was further extended in the case of Reeder v. Union
Trust Co.10 to include the situation where the creditor's suit was still
pending with the provision that there was no defense and the amount due
was known. This view has not, however, been universally followed and
was rejected by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
in the case of Empire Trust Co. v. Bartley." The instant case is in accord
with the line of authority following the Wolmerhausen case and would
allow a surety to sue his co-sureties for contribution prior to the creditor's
obtaining judgment against the plaintiff surety.12
2. Layer v. Nelson, 1 Vern. 456, 23 Eng. Rep. 582 (Ch. 1687) ; STEARNS SURETY-
SHIP § 262 (3d ed. 1922).
3. Wormleighton v. Hunter, Godb. 243, 78 Eng. Rep. 141 (K.B. 1614).
4. Fleetwood v. Charnock, Nels. 10, 21 Eng. Rep. 776 (Ch. 1629), "Contribution
is bottomed and fixed on general principles of justice, and does not spring from
contract; although the contract may qualify it."
5. Davies v. Humphreys, 6 M. & W. 153, 151 Eng. Rep. 361 (Ex. 1840).
6. Couch v. Terry's Adm'r, 12 Ala. 225 (1847); Comstock v. Potter, 158 N.W.
102 (Mich. 1916).
7. STEARNS, SURETYSHIP § 269 (3d ed. 1922).
8. [1893] 2 Ch. 514.
9. 235 Pa. 99, 83 Atl. 607 (1912).
10. 26 Pa. Dist. 833 (C.P. Lanc. Ca. 1917).
11. 16 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 1939). It appears anomalous, at least to this
writer, that such an opinion should prevail in New York, the home of the much
questioned case of Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (N.Y. 1819), which takes the
view that a surety is discharged if after the principal debt has become due, the de-
fendant-surety shows that he has verbally requested the creditor to proceed against
the principal debtor and as a consequence of failure to comply with this request,
neither creditor nor surety is able to collect from the principal. See ARNOLD,
SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 122 (1927).
12. Although the agreement in the instant case provided that New York is
the place in which "the transactions hereunder will take place" and the substantive
law of New York was found to be applicable, the court states that the extent to
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RECENT DECISIONS
As a reason for refusing to allow the plaintiff surety to maintain
his suit against the co-surety prior to his payment of more than his share
of the common obligation the court in the Empire Trust case expressed
its fear that if it were to allow this the co-surety could be required to pay
twice on the obligation.1 3 This fear would, in the light of the remedy
proposed in the instant case, appear to be groundless. Where the creditor
is not a party this court would grant a prospective order directing the
co-surety to indemnify the plaintiff surety against further liability "upon
payment by the surety of his share." Thus, the order upon the co-surety
to pay his share of the obligation would be conditioned upon payment by
the plaintiff of his proportionate share.14 Alternatively where the creditor
is made a party the order would require payment directly to him. On the
other hand, the hardship which could be imposed upon a co-surety under
the rule expounded by the New York court was pointed out in the
Wolmerhausen case where it was said:
"If a man were surety with nine others for £10,000 it might be a
ruinous hardship if he were compelled to raise the whole £10,000 at
once and perhaps to pay interest on the £9,000 until he could recover
the £9,000 by actions or debtor summonses against his co-sureties."
This argument would appear to be even more persuasive when property
of the surety has been attached by the creditor and is subject to being sold
in satisfaction of the obligation. The rule adopted by the court in the
instant case is that favored by the textwriters generally 15 and appears
to be supported by the principles of fairness traditionally applied in equity. 16
Norman J. Shachoy
which the obligations imposed by New York law "can be protected under available
Massachusetts equitable remedies and procedures is to be determined by the Massa-
chusetts forum by Massachusetts law." Nissenberg v. Felleman 162 N.E.2d 304, 309
(Mass. 1959).
13. "Thus if the impleaded defendants . . . are required to pay ... their
proportion of the common liability and . .. [plaintiffs] . . . should fail to pay the
note, they could, nevertheless be held liable to . . . [the creditor] . . . on their
endorsements for the full amount of the note." Empire Trust Co. v. Bartley & Co.
16 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 1939) ; This fear has, in at least two other cases, been the
basis for holding that a surety may not sue his principal for exoneration without
joining the principal creditor. Moore v. Topliff, 107 Ill. 241 (1883) ; Stephenson
v. Taverners, 9 Gratt. 398 (Va. 1852).
14. Nissenberg v. Felleman, 162 N.E.2d 304, 309 (Mass. 1959).
15. ARNOLD, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 301 (3d ed. 1905) ; SIMPSON, SURETY-
SHIP § 46 (1950); STEARNS, SURETYSHIP § 270 (3d ed. 1922); 4 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 1275 (Rev. ed. 1936).
16. It is obvious that the enforcement of this right may not hinder the creditor
in any way, notwithstanding the suit for exoneration he may proceed to judgment
and execution against the surety. Roberts v. American Bonding Co., 83 Ill. 463
(1899); Hence the realization upon the right is dependent upon the inaction of the
creditor against the surety.
SPRING 1960]
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